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To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are?
In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self
Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component
of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving
from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The
Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such as altering
political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other
categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling
technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined
that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in
identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical
domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to
abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect (Study 3). Exploring the breadth of this effect
we also found an Anaesthetic Self Effect. That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic
indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact
on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure
activities, such as hiking or playing video games (Study 4). Across our studies, the
Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken
together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic
selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take
these to be transformative changes.
Keywords: aesthetic emotions, aesthetic preferences, art, beauty, moral values, music, personal identity, self
INTRODUCTION
Within philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, research on personal identity has tended to
focus on certain traits such as memory or experience of agency. In ordinary life, however,
the identities we construct and convey to others are often related to our preferences: the
things we care about and like. Recently, this aspect of identity has been studied with a
focus on moral values. A number of studies have suggested that changes in moral values are
construed as changes in personal identity (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014; Prinz and Nichols, 2016;
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Heiphetz et al., 2017). But what about other kinds of values? Our
daily life is replete with decisions that reflect our aesthetic values
and preferences. What shall I wear? What shall I watch on
television? What music shall I listen to? Some follow their favorite
musician on social media and adapt further aesthetic preferences
from them. Others invest time and significant resources to see art
shows in museums. Our hypothesis in this paper is that aesthetic
preferences and the arts could be also closely linked to the self and
that a change in taste and aesthetic values may be construed as a
change in who one is.
Philosophers of art have investigated that nature of taste
and aesthetic judgment (Hume, 2000, [1739]; Zangwill, 2019),
but there has been comparatively little work on the links
between taste and identity. Here we explore this relationship with
four experimental studies. We show that changes in taste are
interpreted as changes in identity and we found that the degree
of impact on identity varies with the degree of the aesthetic
change. The self has many dimensions, but one seems to relate
to the arts. As such, our findings suggest that the construction of
identity includes our relationship to cultural artifacts. That bears
on how we should think about the self — it may be more cultural
than some theories have emphasized — and how we think about
the arts — they are not merely forms of entertainment but also
constitute important values we care about and that are central to
us. Hence, we are aesthetic selves: central aspects of our identity
are constituted by cultural and art-related preferences.
Prior Work Relating to Art, Aesthetics,
and Identity
To our knowledge, there has been no work to date using
psychological methods to explore intuitions about the
relationship between aesthetic taste, the arts, and personal
identity. Still, there is research that adds plausibility
to our hypothesis.
First, there is much work in sociology on the nature of
subcultures. Philosophers and cognitive scientists tend to focus
on highly individual aspects of identity, such as autobiographical
memories, but, for sociologists and some social psychologists,
identity is more frequently associated with the social groups
to which we belong, and these include groups united by taste
in the arts. The most obvious examples come from music:
youth subcultures such as goths, punks, and deadheads are
conceptualized as contributing to identity (Hebdige, 1979).
Sociologists have also traced connections between aesthetic taste
and social class. For example, preference for classical (Katz-
Gerro, 2002) or eclectic music (Peterson and Kern, 1996) might
help one indicate one’s social status. Similar things hold for
art expertise and museum attendance (Bourdieu et al., 1990;
Hanquinet, 2013). Such observations indicate that our taste
can help us form social groups and signal to others who we
are and where we stand in society. Related to this is the idea
of aesthetic tribalism: Taste choices come in groups. If we
share one aesthetic commitment with a social group we might
unwittingly adopt more of their choices, aesthetic and otherwise,
picking up its aesthetic convictions rather than consciously
adopting them, which gives our aesthetic participation a highly
social touch (Lopes, 2018). Interestingly, seminal research on
“minimal group” formation also has used taste in paintings (Klee
vs. Kandinsky) to induce preferential treatment of in-groups
(Tajfel, 1970).
Second, there has been a substantial body of work examining
links between personality traits and aesthetic interests for music
and the arts. Studies into art preferences – the extent to which
individuals like or dislike different styles of paintings – have
represented the dominant approach in the area of personality
and art, no doubt because of the relative straightforwardness
of classifying artistic products according to established schools.
Even before personality traits were “invented” (i.e., prior to
the development of trait taxonomies), psychological eminencies
such as Burt (1933) and Eysenck (1940) examined personality
differences in ratings of different paintings. Even today, empirical
aesthetics is in no small part shaped by individual differences in
taste and preference (Jacobsen, 2006). Factors such as “openness
to experience” as well as other traits can be used to predict
artistic preferences (Furnham and Walker, 2001; Chamorro-
Premuzic et al., 2009; Swami and Furnham, 2014). Significantly
less research has been devoted to the questions of how much
aesthetic traits actually matter to us and to what extent we
perceive them as being central to us as a person. There have been
some claims regarding an “artistic personality” whose openness,
curiosity, imagination, and creativity leads to a greater proclivity
for aesthetic experiences (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2007). Yet
the complementary question has, to our knowledge, never been
studied: would a change in my preferences change me?
Third, there is recent evidence that moral values play a central
role for our identity, prompting researchers to postulate a “moral
self ” (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014; Prinz and Nichols, 2016).
Within philosophy, morals and aesthetics are regarded as the
two main domains of value. Unlike “descriptive” domains, which
capture how things actually are, normative domains describe
how things should be, and terms of evaluation (such as good
and bad) are used to assess cases that meet or violate those
norms. In both morals and aesthetics, we make such evaluative
judgments. This invites the question: If morals are important
to identity, why not aesthetics? The link between morality and
identity may relate to the fact that morality is emotionally charged
(Greene and Haidt, 2002). We feel our moral values deeply,
and experience intense emotions when they are instantiated or
violated (Avramova and Inbar, 2013). The same might be true for
aesthetic values. That we invest a lot of energy and resources to
engage in aesthetic experiences of artworks or to encounter our
favorite musicians and bands in concerts is already an indication
that our aesthetic choices might in fact matter a great deal
to us. It only seems plausible that our aesthetic taste is also
important to who we are. It is this taste that determines the
range of aesthetic objects and experiences we value. Similar to our
moral evaluations of social situations aesthetic evaluations are
also inherently affective. They are motivational states related to
dispositions of our embodied and situated self to act on the world
(Prinz, 2011; Fingerhut and Prinz, 2018a). This link of art and
emotion (complementary to the moral-emotions link) provides
a further reason to explore the possibility that aesthetic taste is
related to identity.
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These findings offer circumstantial reasons for hypothesizing
an “aesthetic self.” If preferences for certain arts are linked to
social group membership, personality, and emotionally grounded
values, then changes in our aesthetic preferences should be
perceived as a threat to our identity and transform us. The main
aim of this investigation is, therefore, to explore whether changes
in aesthetic tastes actually exert an impact on perceived identity.
Self and Diachronic Personal Identity
Philosophical discussions of personal identity usually focus on
“diachronic identity,” or changes across transformations that take
place in time. Philosophers also distinguish between qualitative
and quantitative (or “numerical”) concepts of identity. To be
numerically identical with oneself in the past is to be the exact
same person. Thought experiments suggest that this notion of
identity is often not what we care about. For example, if a person
walked into a fission machine that created two psychological and
physical duplicates of herself, both these duplicates would feel
a sense of identity with the original person, but they couldn’t
be numerically identical to her (Parfit, 1984). What we care
about is some kind of continuity with our past, be it physical
or psychological. In ordinary life, when we think about being
the same person or same self over time, metaphysical notions of
numerical identity matter less than preserving certain traits we
see as centrally belonging to us.
When it comes to preservation of identity, it is likely that
we care about more than just one trait. There are numerous
theories of the self each presenting a different perspective and
utilizing an array of methodologies. Some emphasize physical
continuity (Williams, 1970) while others focus on preservation of
psychological traits (Parfit, 1971), such as memory (Locke, 1690),
personal narratives (Schechtman, 1996), or agency (Korsgaard,
1989). Within embodied cognition the autonomous organism
has been identified as the basis for continuity from a first
person perspective (Fuchs, 2017), combining a biological with a
psychological approach.
These are sometimes presented as competing theories, but
they need not be. Recent “pattern theories of the self ” aim to
unify and systemize those theories by pointing toward a clusters
of features that constitute the self (Gallagher, 2013; Newen, 2018).
Such a theory requires a multifaceted approach. It defends such
clusters against prevalent deflationist and reductionist accounts
that highlight only one feature at the expense of others as being
central for a self. We also follow them in their call for an
interdisciplinary approach that aims to organize claims ranging
from aspects of minimal embodiment and self-consciousness
(including their neural dynamics), affect (such as emotional
patterns), cognition (such as memory), to more situated aspects
(such as cultural and normative practices). In particular, we will
contribute to the understanding of the latter aspect by focusing on
aesthetic engagement with the arts and cultural artifacts (such as
music and visual art) by possibly touching on the affective basis of
those relations as well. We also follow pattern theories in another
aspect: instead of identifying minimal, necessary conditions we
focus on what could be considered jointly sufficient conditions
for an individual self. The idea here is that several factors, albeit
to varying extents, contribute to the construction of such a self.
In this respect we will explore changes in one’s life under which
we might not consider ourselves to be the same person after the
change. What changes would make somebody a new person?
What kind of transitions in traits, preferences, and activities
would have the biggest impact on who we think we are? Which
changes are viewed as transformational with respect to identity?
Testing Intuitions About Identity
Only recently have traits thought to be integral to sustaining one’s
identity been tested with experimental methods. In a pioneering
experimental philosophy study, Nichols and Bruno (2010) found
that both memory and preservation of the body are judged to
be important for personal identity. As noted above, more recent
work, has explored the role of moral values in identity, and
preservation of these is judged to be even more important for
identity than memory (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014; Prinz
and Nichols, 2016). In a typical study, participants are asked
to consider situations in which various traits change, such as
memory, cognitive capacities, and moral values, and then are
asked to judge whether the affected individual is the same person
after the change. Moral change vignettes have proven to elicit a
significantly greater impact than any other trait to which it has
been compared to date.
We aim to extend this empirical literature by more
systematically addressing the category of taste, aesthetic and
otherwise. As mentioned above, aesthetics constitutes a further
domain of values, beyond morals. In psychology, values are
often seen as norms that guide our behavior and are captured
in series of multidimensional scales (Hanel et al., 2018). Our
investigation builds upon this research and extends it toward
aesthetic values (such as beauty, the arts, and preference for
specific artforms and music). Curiously, prior studies found that
changes in preferences (loss of enjoyment of favorite food or
rock music) and changes in art engagement (loss of the ability to
appreciate art) failed to yield a strong impact on our perceived
identity (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014). Given the literature
reviewed above, we felt this relationship demands a more
thorough investigation. In a series of experiments, we presented
participants with vignettes that prompt them to imagine their
tastes changing and then asked them to what extent they would
perceive themselves to be the same person after the change. The
striking finding across all our experiments is that taste changes
are among the changes that present the biggest threat to the
identity of a person. We therefore could show that we are not just
moral selves but crucially aesthetic selves as well.
STUDY 1: A SERIES OF WORLDLY
CHANGES
Introduction
Our first study examines the impact of a series of mundane
life changes on the perceived identity of a person. We adapted
methods employed in previous vignette studies that specified a
trait change and asked participants to what degree they would
perceive themselves or others as being the same person after
such a change (Blok et al., 2005; Strohminger and Nichols, 2014).
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Whereas those studies often focus on an extraordinary event
(car crash, brain transplant, and incarnation) followed by a
psychological trait change (loss of memory and moral change)
we simplified our conditions by including everyday changes
that might occur in one’s life while omitting the reference
to a mediating variable (such as an extraordinary event or
an underlying neurodegenerative cause, see Strohminger and
Nichols, 2015). Our vignettes included changes in neighborhood,
occupation, leisure activities, political and religious orientation,
and most importantly taste. Each participant was introduced to
the concept of personal identity in the following way:1
For the presented example of a change, we want you to ask yourself:
“Would I be the same person?” if this change takes place. How would
I regard myself after the change? And how would others regard me?”
This was followed by a question regarding the importance of
a domain for the participant (e.g., music, politics, religion, etc.),
followed by a vignette from this domain, e.g.:
Suppose your taste in music changed dramatically. For example, if
you enjoy only classical music, imagine you grew to like listening
to only pop music.
Or:
Suppose your religion changed dramatically. For example, if you are
a person of faith, imagine you became an atheist.
Participants were then asked to what extent they would
consider themselves the same person after the change on a scale
from “completely” to “not at all.” This is what we considered a
judgment of identity. The higher a participant’s rating on this
scale the more we take it that a given trait has an effect on
perceived identity. Hence, when we speak of a larger Self Effect,
it is because participants’ ratings on this scale were comparably
higher than for other traits.
We were particularly interested in assessing how changes in
taste impact the sense of self compared to changes in hobbies
or changes in moral domains. We therefore included two taste
conditions (a change in music preference and a change in
food taste from “liking spicy to liking only mild food”) and
two changes in leisure activities (“becoming passionate about
playing video games” or ”hiking” after having no interest in those
activities before). In line with the recent literature on the topic,
moral changes should have a bigger impact than other changes
(Prinz and Nichols, 2016). We therefore included two conditions
that should indicate a moral value change, for which we predicted
the largest Self Effect. Those were changes in political orientation
(conservative to more left wing) and changes in general religious
outlook (from atheist to believer).
We predicted that changes in musical taste would impact
identity, though perhaps not as strongly as changes in moral
values (exemplified by the two highly moralized domains religion
and politics). Contrary to previous studies that found that among
a variety of conditions changes in aesthetic preferences and art
engagements were among the changes with the least impact on
1All studies reported in this paper were conducted in German. Translations into
English are from the authors JF and CW (consult Supplementary Material A1).
identity (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014), we hypothesized that
taste in the arts (e.g., musical taste) should be associated with
identity. This was based on the literature reviewed above. We had
no such clear predictions with respect to changes in taste outside
the arts, such as food preferences, although it has been argued
that the homeostatic need to appraise food might also be the basis
for aesthetic appraisals of objects more generally and supervenes
on some shared brain circuitry (Brown et al., 2011). In order
to test whether the presented changes were indeed perceived as
changes in morals or in taste, we assessed this in a pretest with an
independent sample (consult Pretest 1 below).
Aside from leisure activities (video games and hiking) we
included two more comparison categories: occupation (changes
with respect to job or chores), and location (change of
neighborhood or country). We predicted that changes in each of
these dimensions would have some impact on perceived identity.
In particular, we expected to replicate the impact of moral
change on identity, and our key prediction was that aesthetic
changes (explored via the category of taste) would also be highly
associated with changes in identity—a prediction that has not
been established or systematically explored in prior work.
Materials and Methods
Pretest 1
251 German adults (Mdn age = 34, range 18–68; 36.9% identified
as female, 61.1% identified as male) were recruited for the
Pretest online via Clickworker. Seven additional participants were
excluded for failing to complete the study. Approval for all
studies was obtained from the CUNY University Committee on
Activities Involving Human Subjects (UCAIHS; IRB-2016-0794).
This test was set up in order to assess whether our grouping of
traits into a Moral and Taste change category was valid (consult
Table 1 for our initial grouping). We exclusively focused on
ratings on moral and taste change in our Pretest, since those
two domains comprise what are considered values in philosophy.
We therefore conducted a Pretest with an independent sample
from the main study. Participants were randomly assigned to one
condition producing a 10 × 1 between-subjects design. We asked
participants to rate how important a domain was for them (e.g.,
music, politics, religion, neighborhood, etc.) on a seven-point
Likert scale anchored at “not at all” and “very much.” This was
followed by a vignette indicating a change in that domain. We
then asked participants to rate whether this amounts to a change
in moral values (Q1: “To what extent is this change a change in
moral values?”) or in taste (Q2: “To what extent is this change a
change in taste?”) on a seven-point Likert scale anchored at “not
at all” and “very much.” Q1 and Q2 were presented in random
order. Afterward, participants were directed to answer a small
series of demographic questions (Supplementary Material A2).
Study 1
359 German adults (age = 17.3%: 18–24, 38.7%: 25–35, 30.1%: 35–
50, 13.9%:>50; 45.4% identified as female, 54.3% as male) were
recruited online via Amazon’s MTurk platform. Eight additional
participants were excluded for failing to complete the study.
The set-up and wording were the same as in the Pretest (10 × 1
between-subjects design): we asked participants to rate how
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TABLE 1 | List of vignettes used in Study 1.
Category Domain Item
Morals Religion Being a faithful believer to becoming an atheist
Politics Changing from liberal to conservative party
Taste Music Liking classical music to liking pop music
Food Liking spicy food to liking mild food
Leisure Recreation Not caring about hiking to growing passionate
about it
Pastime Not playing video games to becoming passionate
about them
Occupation Job Working as a lawyer to becoming a teacher
Chores Hating housework to enjoy vacuuming
Location Neighborhood Moving from inner city to the suburbs
Country Moving from Germany to southern hemisphere
Ordered per category in descending order of predicted impact on the self.
important a certain domain was for them and presented them one
change vignette that corresponded to this domain. Then they had
to rate to what extent they would consider themselves to be the
same after the change (“Would you regard yourself as the same
person?”) on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (“very much”)
to 7 (“not at all”), followed by the same demographic questions
as in Pretest 1.
Results and Discussion
Pretest 1
In this test we could confirm our coding for taste and moral
change. When asked to rate to what extent the changes
we presented constitute a moral (Q1) or taste change (Q2),
religion and politics were rated highest on the moral change
question (Table 2). Food and music ranked highest on the
taste change question. Interestingly, our two Leisure conditions
(videogames and hiking) ranked highly on both measures. We
first tested participant ratings in our ten conditions for measures
for normality; however, Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–
Wilk’s tests showed that participant scores were not normally
distributed (all p < 0.05).2 A Kruskal–Wallis test showed that
there was a statistically significant difference across conditions
for both Q1 [H(9) = 26.351, p = 0.002], and Q2 [H(9) = 27.639,
p = 0.001].
1. Moral Change: post hoc pairwise comparisons for our
moral change question were done using Mann–Whitney
U tests and showed no significant difference between our
Religion (median, “Mdn” = 5.0) and politics conditions
(Mdn = 5.0): U = 269.5, z = −0.851, p = 0.395. Changes
in religion and politics were rated significantly higher as
a moral change than the Music (Mdn = 3.0) and Food
conditions (Mdn = 3.0). Music vs. Religion: U = 163.0,
z = −3.095, p = 0.002, and vs. politics: U = 180.5,
2The non-normality finding was robust and consistent throughout all the datasets
reported in this paper. Given the distributions of our data, alongside our use
of ordinal measures, we therefore will report the results of non-parametric tests
throughout this paper. Consult Diaz et al. (2017) and Gomez-Lavin and Rachar’s
(2019) recent work in experimental philosophy which both serve to highlight the
use of non-parametric methods for similar vignette styled experiments.
TABLE 2 | Means and SD for amount of moral change (Q1) and taste change
(Q2) in Pretest 1.
Moral change Mean (SD) Taste change Mean (SD)
Religion 4.72 (1.823) Food 5.19 (1.494)
Politics 4.44 (1.444) Music 5.08 (1.269)
Job 4.13 (2.007) Recreation 4.77 (1.250)
Recreation 3.92 (1.708) Pastime 4.60 (1.497)
Country 3.60 (1.600) Country 4.40 (1.697)
Pastime 3.40 (1.414) Politics 4.20 (1.470)
Neighborhood 3.23 (1.648) Job 4.04 (1.546)
Food 3.19 (1.545) Religion 3.96 (2.010)
Music 3.04 (1.698) Neighborhood 3.81 (1.710)
Chores 2.96 (1.620) Chores 3.33 (1.795)
Listed are all domains in descending order of means.
z = −2.776, p = 0.005; Food vs. Religion: U = 171.0,
z = −2.94, p = 0.003, and vs. Politics: U = 184.5, z = −2.694,
p = 0.007.
2. Taste change: our Food (Mdn = 5.5) and Music conditions
(Mdn = 5.0) received the highest participant ratings of
taste-change, but did not differ significantly from each
other, U = 305.5, z = −0.613, p = 0.54. Our Food condition
differed significantly from both Politics (Mdn = 4.0),
U = 198.00, z = −2.45, p = 0.014, and Religion (Mdn = 5.0),
U = 211.00, z = −2.19, p = 0.028, whereas Music differed
significantly from Politics: U = 212.0, z = −2.224, p = 0.026,
but not from Religion: U = 239.5, z = −1.663, p = 0.096.
Apart from the last result, the Pretest fully confirmed our
coding for the main categories of moral and taste change.
Study 1
Self Effect Within Categories
We carried out pairwise comparisons of the rated Self Effect
within our five categories (Morals, Taste, Leisure, Occupation,
and Location), which each consisted of two domains. To compare
the Self Effect between two domains within a category we used
the non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test. We only found one
significant difference in those pairwise comparisons. This was
within the Taste category: Music taste changes (Mdn = 4.0)
had a significantly stronger Self Effect than food taste changes
(Mdn = 2.0), U = 194.5, z = −2.666, p = 0.008. We
therefore separated music and food into independent categories:
“Taste-Aesthetic” and “Taste-Gustatory,” all other pairs were
combined into meta-conditions correlating to a category. This
left us with six meta-conditions: Morals, Music, Food, Location,
Occupation, and Leisure.
Self Effect Between Categories
We used Kruskal–Wallis comparisons between our meta-
conditions adjusted by Bonferroni corrections for multiple tests,
followed by pairwise comparisons using Mann–Whitney U test.
A Kruskal–Wallis test indicated that our categories elicited an
effect on our perceived self-change measure, H(5) = 15.132,
p = 0.01 (For a list of means per items and category consult
Table 3). Mann–Whitney U tests between our conditions showed
that Self Effect did not differ between Location (Mdn = 2.0) and
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TABLE 3 | Means and SD for Self Effect for all domains in Study 1.
Category Domain Mean (SD)
Per item Per category
Taste-A Music 3.81 (1.806) 3.81 (1.806)
Morals Religion 4.12 (2.155) 3.63 (2.023)
Politics 3.30 (1.856)
Leisure Recreation 3.55 (1.955) 3.46 (1.893)
Pastime 3.37 (1.816)
Occupation Job 3.48 (1.815) 3.42 (1.713)
Chores 3.40 (1.671)
Location Country 3.06 (2.154) 2.82 (1.947)
Neighborhood 2.58 (1.681)
Taste-G Food 2.48 (1.446) 2.48 (1.446)
In descending order of mean per category and then domain per category. Our
Taste category has been split, post hoc, into two Taste categories: Taste-Aesthetic
(Music) and Taste-Gustatory (Food).
Taste-Gustatory conditions (Mdn = 2.0), U = 734.5, z = −0.391,
p = 0.696. Those two conditions received significantly lower
Self Effect ratings compared to all other conditions such
as Occupation (Mdn = 3.0), Leisure (Mdn = 3.0), Morals
(Mdn = 3.0), and Taste-Aesthetic (Mdn = 4.0), all p = 0.037. The
biggest difference was between the Taste-Gustatory (Mdn = 2.0)
and the aesthetic vignette referring to a change in music-
preference: Taste-Aesthetic (Mdn = 4.0), U = 194.5, z = −2.666,
p = 0.008 (Figure 1).
Discussion
Our first finding was that the Taste-Aesthetic condition elicited
the second strongest Self Effect (3.81). This gave us an initial
indication of an Aesthetic Self Effect that had not been reported
to date and that contradicts earlier findings that established no
such effect for aesthetic conditions (Strohminger and Nichols,
2014). Only the Religion condition exhibited a nominally higher
mean for our self-measure (4.12).3 Interestingly, none of the two
measures of our Pretest (impact on moral values, impact on taste)
correlated significantly with the Self Effects for the same ten
items rated in Study 1. There is a positive correlation between
Moral ratings and Self Effect, though, that simply may have not
reached significance due to the low number of correlated items
(n = 10, Spearman’s correlations of Moral-Pretest and Self Effect:
3The slightly lower ratings for political affiliation change compared to religion
(both moral conditions) might have been an artifact of the rather leveled political
landscape in Germany in 2017 during the time we conducted Study 1. Especially
the two main parties named in our vignettes, CDU (mid-conservative) and SPD
(mid-left-wing) were in a coalition at the time and, might not have been perceived
as being that different in political-moral outlook. (The conservative party, e.g.,
at the time promoted pro-choice and pro-immigration views following Angela
Merkel’s “We can do it!” proclamation regarding increased refugee intake in
Germany). We would predict a stronger change in identity with similar vignettes
for countries with a two-party system, such as the United States, where switching
from supporting the Republican Party to supporting the Democrat Party might be
perceived as a much bigger change in identity. This points toward a need for cross-
cultural studies to examine possible differences for what participants of different
cultural backgrounds consider being central for their perceived identity. We aimed
to mitigate possible cultural differences and other confounds by including a direct
measure (Q1 and Q2) of perceived moral (and taste) change in our Pretest that
indeed showed a moral effect for our Politics condition.
r = 0.285, p = 0.425). There was no indication of a correlation
between Taste and Self Effect (r = −0.079, p = 0.829), which
led us conclude that the Taste dimension we asked for in the
Pretest is either in itself not central for identity or contains several
dimensions (consult discussion below). This is in line with the
finding that Taste-Aesthetic and Taste-Gustatory (ranking both
highest on the taste measure Q2) also differ significantly with
respect to our self-measure. Because of this finding we conducted
a post hoc split of the Taste category into Music and Food and
decided to explore this difference in the studies reported below.
That we found stronger Self Effects for the Taste-Aesthetic
and Morals categories confirmed our general predictions for
value changes. Somewhat surprisingly, the Self Effect elicited
in those domains did not differ significantly from our Leisure
or Occupation domains (which in part might be explain by a
difference in wording, see Study 4 below). The Location category
worked well as a control, generating a significantly smaller Self
Effect than all other categories (except Taste-Gustatory) and
possibly driven by the lack of any strong value change associated
with relocation. In another set of studies on the effects of
immigration in this respect we indeed were able to show that
a relocation that is accompanied by a value change elicits a
significantly stronger Self Effect (Gomez-Lavin et al., n.d.).
Our Pretest confirmed that Music and Food preference
changes are perceived as changes in taste, as those conditions
ranked highest with respect to our taste-measure (Table 2). While
the Pretest supported our grouping, Music and Food differed
significantly with respect to our self-measure (Figure 2 and
Table 3). One explanation is that the two domains of our initial
Taste category might differ with respect to social signaling. Our
music preference might be an indicator of the social groups we
belong to, which might not hold to the same extent for our food
preferences. Another possible confound could be the ambiguity
of the Taste question (Q2) itself. The question (“To what extent
is this change a change in taste?”) might be perceived as asking
two things at the same time: whether there is significant shift in
the preferred experiential qualities, or whether it is a shift with
respect to the more longstanding aesthetic sensitivity of a person
that might also be seen as an overall improvement (e.g., used in
the context of a person having an enhanced taste for the ‘finer
things in life’).4 Future studies might aim to disambiguate the two
meanings, e.g., by additionally asking whether one might be more
or less a “person of taste” after the change.
Based on the initial finding for music preference changes
(Taste-Aesthetic), we first wanted to explore the robustness of
the Self Effect within aesthetic domains (by including further
aesthetic change conditions). In order to determine whether we
found a genuine aesthetic effect, we also decided to implement
more direct measures of aesthetic differences in the follow-
up studies. The aim was to assess a possible direct relation of
aesthetic contrasts to our Self Effect (see Study 2 and 3 on changes
in music genre preferences). So far, we did not find a correlation
between what was considered a taste change in Pretest 1 and the
4The latter has a longstanding history in the philosophy of aesthetics and has been
prominently discussed in Hume’s treatment of the development of taste of the
“ideal judge” regarding artistic works and his claims that taste is the basis for both,
moral and aesthetic judgments (Hume, 2000, [1739]).
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FIGURE 1 | Box plots of participants’ responses for Self Effect across categories in Study 1, ∗p < 0.05, two-tailed. Y-axis indicates full range of possible answers on
a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (“very much”) to 7 (“not at all the same person”).
FIGURE 2 | Similarity map of music genres in two-dimensional space as assessed in Pretest 2. The y-axis represents dimension 1 of our mapping, the x-axis
dimension two. Changes in preference that have been used in the respective studies are indicated by an arrow that also marks the direction of change. (A) Graph
shows Classical-to-Pop change used in Study 1, red indicates that this change is perceived as having a significantly stronger Self Effect than the other taste change
in this study, p < 0.01, consult also Figure 1. (B) Aesthetic taste changes presented in Study 2: Only Country-to-Folk (indicated by blue) shows a significantly lower
Self Effect to the other preference changes presented (red), p < 0.05. (C) Aesthetic Taste Changes presented in Study 3: The Far-Genres (red) show a significantly
higher Self Effect compared to the Close-Genres (blue), p < 0.05.
self-measure in Study 1. Yet perhaps such a correlation could
be found for aesthetic differences of the items used within one
vignette, which we explored in Study 2.
STUDY 2: EXPLORING THE AESTHETIC
SELF EFFECT FOR MUSIC
Introduction
Study 2 was set-up to replicate our findings from Study 1 and
to establish the robustness of the Aesthetic Self Effect for music.
We therefore wanted to ensure that the effect was not an artifact
of our specific choice of genres in Study 1. After all, we only
described one transition (from classical to pop music preference,
n = 27), and our effect might therefore be contingent upon this
particular change.5 We decided to first map aesthetic differences
5Classical music may, e.g., be associated with a kind of German national identity
and the Self Effect therefore not driven by aesthetics in this case. We tested for
this possibility by asking a subset of our participants in Study 2 (n = 53) whether
“Classical music is a particularly German art form,” to which our participants
between music genres in a Pretest and then, in a second step,
to apply our self-measure to conditions that included changes
between specific genres of our mapping (Study 2). For the Pretest
we asked participants to rate the similarities between all possible
combinations of ten genres. We used multidimensional scaling to
construct a map of the relationship among musical genres based
on participants’ perceptions of their similarities (Figure 2A).
The Pop genre turned out to be centrally located in the two-
dimensional similarity space, whereas Classical is located in the
periphery near Jazz in the upper right-hand quadrant. The further
any two genres are located from one another in the space, the less
similar they are perceived.
We mapped the genres in order to be able to relate an aesthetic
measure of musical similarity to our Self Effect measure. In
largely agreed giving a median response of 5 (M = 4.53, SD = 1.512) on a scale
of 1 to 7, with seven being “very much.” This is compared to lower responses for
Pop as a German art form (Mdn = 4, M = 3.53, SD = 1.207). A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test showed that classical music was considered significantly more German
(Z = 20, p < 0.001). This vindicated our decision to consider other genres beyond
classical music.
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order to test whether such aesthetic differences had an impact
on our identity question, we created a series of variants of
our original prompt based on the information we garnered
from our multidimensional maps. We decided to test the effect
of directionality (by including a reversal of the change from
our original vignette in Study 1). Additionally we wanted to
explore the possible role of the dimensions of the map (therefore
including changes across the y and x-axes) and whether distance
to the center of the map would have an effect (including changes
between genres that are at roughly the same distance from the
center, whereas our original Classical-to-Pop vignette was more a
center-periphery change). As a last condition we also included the
two genres that are closest together, Folk and Country. All others
genre comparisons used for Study 2 were 2–4 times as distant on
the map (consult Figures 2A–C for full graphical rendering of all
the changes for which we tested a Self Effect). We predicted that a
change from the center of the map to the periphery (e.g., Pop-to-
Classical) might elicit a stronger effect because it would indicate a
more refined and distinguished taste. We speculated that possibly
one of our two dimensions (depicted as the y and x-axis) might
correlate more strongly to changes in perceived identity.6
Hence, we predict that changing one’s preference among
aesthetically similar genres (such as Country-to-Folk) should
yield a smaller Self Effect, thus confirming that the aesthetic
properties of genres drive their relative impacts to identity.
Another prediction was that some genre changes would signal
a change in social group membership related to the respective
genres. To test for this possibility, we included an additional
dependent variable in Studies 2 (and all follow-up studies) that
aimed to measure whether changes in taste were perceived as
impacting social relationships. This was added in an effort to
determine whether the Aesthetic Self Effect that we found in
Study 1 might stem from the fact that musical preferences
can be associated with membership in social groups, such as
subcultures. The conjecture was that sociality, alongside the
aesthetic properties of genres we determine, could drive our
effects. As others have shown: preferences for music are likely
affected by both social and auditory characteristics (Rentfrow
et al., 2011). More generally our findings align with studies that
establish that personality traits seem to systematically correlate
with music genre preferences (for a summary of studies to this
effect see: Schäfer and Mehlhorn, 2017).
Materials and Methods
Pretest 2
45 German adults (Mdn age = 38, range 18–60 years 51.1%
self-identified female) were recruited for the Pretest online via
Clickworker. One additional participant was excluded for failing
to complete the study.
This test was configured in order to assess the similarity
of music genres. Participants were asked to rate ten
genres, presented in pairs, for musical similarity yielding 90
6Here the study was exploratory: it might be that one of the dimensions of our map
actually covered a relation of genres to the effect that it would change a person
more significantly if they switched their preferences between genres aligning on
this dimension.
permutations of which 45 unique combinations were presented
to participants to mitigate participant fatigue. For any two
genres, participants were presented with a scale from 1–100 with
1 anchored at “not at all similar” and 100 at “completely similar.”
The data were analyzed using the PROXSCAL algorithm in SPSS,
with ordinal measurement and Euclidian distance. In addition
to our standard demographic questions we included also an
authoritarianism scale as well as TIPI in this part of the study
(consult Supplementary Material A2).
Study 2
364 German adults (Mdn age = 34; range 18–70; 50.3% identified
as female, 47.3% identified as male) were recruited online via
Clickworker. Ten additional participants were excluded for failing
to complete the study.
The set-up and wording were exactly as in Study 1 (6 × 1
between-subjects design). We generated new vignettes using
genres from the Pretest (for the selection of genres see
the discussion above). As before, we asked participants how
important music was for them and presented them a change-
vignette with a taste change from one genre to another. They
had to rate to what extent they would consider themselves to be
the same after the change. Compared to Study 1 we also added
a Relationship question in order to assess whether the perceived
change correlated to a social change: “To what extent do you
think that such a dramatic change of one person would influence
the relationship to their friends?” on a Likert scale anchored
from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“completely”). Followed by the same
demographic questions as above.
Results and Discussion
Pretest 2
Following standard procedures in multidimensional scaling
(Hout et al., 2013; Tollefsen et al., 2014) we produced a two-
dimensional map of our ten genres with the y-axis representing
the first dimension and the x-axis the second dimension
(Figure 2). With this multidimensional scaling method, a two-
dimensional solution of participant judgments explained 95.78%
of the variance in their responses.7 (We listed all direct mean
rated distance for all our genre combinations as well as the
Euclidean distances of those genres in the map in Supplementary
Material B).
Study 2
Kruskal Wallis tests indicated a significant difference for Self
Effect across our music preference changes H(5) = 11.953,
p = 0.035. In particular, all genre changes showed a significant
difference from the Country-Folk pair (Mdn = 2.0, for the means
for all conditions consult Table 4). This was confirmed by Mann–
Whitney U tests for difference comparing Country-Folk to: Pop-
Classic (Mdn = 4.0, U = 920.0, z = −2.446, p = 0.014), Punk-Jazz
(Mdn = 4.0, U = 899.5, z = −2.944, p = 0.004), Country-Classic
(Mdn = 5.0, U = 916.0, z = −2.751, p = 0.006), Punk-Gospel
(Mdn = 5.0, U = 958.5, z = −2.459, p = 0.014) and Punk-Hip Hop
(Mdn = 4.0, U = 939.0, z = −2.314, p = 0.021).
7Per Tucker’s coefficient of congruence.
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TABLE 4 | Means and SD for Self Effect for all changes in genre preferences in
Study 2.




Country to Classical 4.09 (1.842) 1.304 19.622
Punk to Jazz 4.08 (1.785) 1.152 14.511
Punk to Gospel 3.94 (1.946) 1.467 11.711
Pop to Classic 3.86 (1.613) 1.097 19.378
Punk to HipHop 3.82 (1.682) 0.646 31.600










In descending order of mean Self Effect per item, *p < 0.05, two-tailed. Including
the means of the Euclidean distance on the map and the mean pairwise rated
similarity of the genres from the pretest.
A Spearman’s correlation was run to assess the relationship
between rated Importance and Self Effect for the whole
sample that was not significant, rs = 0.04, p = 0.447;
a Spearman’s correlation between Self Effect and assumed
change to Relationships yielded a positive correlation, which
was statistically significant, rs = 0.33, p = 0.000 (consult
Figure 3).
Discussion
In Study 2 we found a strong Self Effect for all genres that
were above a certain threshold of aesthetic distance. Genres
above this threshold exhibited an Aesthetic Self Effect but did
not differ significantly from each other. Only the genre pair
that was closest on the map elicited a significantly weaker
Self Effect compared to the others. The mean score for this
transition between the closest genres (Country-to-Folk) was a
4.96, significantly lower (p ≤ 0.021) than all other conditions
(for a full list of means for Self Effect and rated aesthetic
similarity of our items consult Table 4). This result confirmed
one of our predictions and led us to conclude that the
Aesthetic Self Effects we found might be influenced by the
perceived aesthetic dissimilarities of the genres that we used
in our vignettes.
We also included a relationship measure in Study 2 that
aimed to capture possible social signaling related to the genre
preference changes we used in our vignettes. This social change
measure indeed correlated within subjects with the reperceived
self-measure (rs = 0.33, p = 0.000 see also Figure 3). The
impact a preference change in music styles would have on the
relationship to friends partially explains why we found an effect.
However, the correlation was not as strong as we predicted,
hinting at the possible role of other mechanisms driving our
effects (consult section “General Discussion” below). For future
studies it might be of interest to compare whether such a
correlation is stronger for moral domains compared to the
aesthetic domain.
For Study 2 we aimed to investigate a wider variety
of genre changes. Based on the map from our Pretest we
chose genre comparisons to cover certain dimensions on the
map (such as movement on the y- and x-axes, directionality
of the change, different distances to the center, etc.) as
well as to include movement between several quadrants
of the map. The directionality of the genre changes for
Study 2 consult the arrows in Figure 2B (additional genre
changes used in Study 3 are displayed in Figure 2C; for
their selection criteria see the “Materials and Methods”
section Study 3).
The relative locations of the genres on our similarity map
did not seem to influence whether a change in preference
between those genres is perceived as having an impact on a
person’s identity. Also, the direction of the change does not
seem to matter. We compared the new Pop-to-Classical to the
original Classical-to-Pop condition (Study 1) in order to assess
whether it makes a difference whether one moves from an
outlier on our map toward the midpoint or from the midpoint
to the periphery, yet a comparison showed no significant
effect, U = 674.0, z = −0.55, p = 0.877, further supporting
our finding that mostly aesthetic distance matters. Neither
directionality, the central-peripheral dimension, nor movement
across specific quadrants on our genre map seems to impact
our self-measure.
FIGURE 3 | Scatter plots of Spearman’s correlations for within-subject ratings of Study 2: (A) shows correlation between rated Self Effect and rated Importance of
music (n.s.); (B) shows correlation between rated Self Effect and rated impact on Relationship (rs = 0.33, p < 0.01).
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We then more directly tested the impact of aesthetic distance
on our self-measure by comparing the Euclidean distance (i.e.,
distances in the two-dimensional similarity maps) with the Self
Effect 2. As predicted, we found that the map distance was
highly correlated to the experience change to identity (r = 0.829,
p = 0.042). The strength of the correlation between participants
was somewhat unexpected. Interestingly, the correlation of the
directly rated similarities (i.e., only looking at the ratings for
the two genres used in the vignette) and the Self Effect did
not reach significance (r = −0.6, p = 0.208). Thus, it is the
aesthetic similarity map itself (and not the directly rated distance
between two genres) that provides a very good approximation
of what figures centrally for the Self Effect. This is a further
indication that it is not just the two genres (and possibly the
allocated social signaling difference related to those two genres)
that influence the assessed effect on identity but possibly other
factors as well (including the relative auditory similarity). Further
studies, for example including direct auditory stimuli (e.g., sound
files), will be needed to determine the full aesthetic dimension of
this effect. The results of Study 2 can nonetheless be understood
as supporting our hypothesis: the greater the aesthetic distance
included in a taste change the greater the impact on the self.
STUDY 3: SELF-REPLICATION AND
EXTENSIONS TO VISUAL ART
Introduction
Based on the successful correlation of aesthetic distance and
the Self Effect we wondered whether our effect would extend
beyond music to other aesthetic domains. Music has been defined
as a formal arrangement of sounds that is intimately bound to
the emotions (Kivy, 2002; Konecni, 2005). We more generally
believe that aesthetic evaluation of art is at its heart emotional
(Fingerhut and Prinz, 2018a,b). We therefore chose to also
explore visual art. Experiencing art in museum contexts has been
related to transformative aesthetic experiences that implicate the
self (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011), and artistic practice has long
been related to identity, a thread that in 20th century art even
became dominant with art exploring transformations of identity,
culturally projected (gender) roles, and societal norms related
to identity (Meagher, 2002; Mauer, 2005). Among the general
population, interest in visual art (or at least “fine art” of the kind
exhibited in museums) may be less widespread. We therefore
predicted that many participants in a random sample would
not self-identity as strongly interested in fine art. In addition,
specific patterns of taste in fine art are less firmly associated
with subcultures than taste in music. Being a punk rocker or a
classical music aficionado brings many associations to mind, but
a preference for one art genre over another is not necessarily
associated with other traits. By exploring whether taste in visual
art is associated with identity we can therefore raise the bar for
the aesthetic self hypothesis. Does the connection between taste
and identity remain even for a domain that is less widely valued
and less associated with subcultures?
In addition to Study 2 we also included aesthetic stimuli
instead of only naming the genres or styles. We used a visual
representations of two artworks, one traditional-representational
and one modern-abstract and asked participants to imagine a
change in preference from one artwork to another (for the
reproduction of artworks used consult Figure 4B). The rationale
behind this was to not just measure the connotations – moral
or otherwise – that our wording in descriptive vignettes might
have, but the impact on identity based on a more direct aesthetic
assessment. This was meant to accompany the measured impact
of an aesthetic difference on the self that we attempted with
similiarity maps in Study 2. We nonetheless also included
a descriptive vignette for the kind of art preference change
(Traditional-to-Modern).
Materials and Methods
237 German adults (Mdn age = 30; range 18–71; 42.2% identified
as female, 57.0% identified as male) were recruited for the
Pretest online via Clickworker. Two additional participants were
excluded for failing to complete the study. This study was set
up as a replication of the Taste-split (between Taste-Aesthetic
and Taste-Gustatory) from Study 1 and as an extension to other
artforms using the same between-subjects design (10 × 1) with
the same wording as before, yielding vignettes with preference
FIGURE 4 | (A) Participants’ responses for Self Effect across categories in Study 3, ∗p < 0.05, two-tailed, ∗∗p < 0.005, two-tailed. Y-axis indicates possible
answers on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (“very much”) to 7 (“not at all the same person”). (B) Examples of artworks used as exemplars for preference change in
the Art condition in Study 3. Change in preference from left (Romney, 1782) to right image (Malevich, 1915); no titles given in vignette.
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changes from Food, Music, and Art categories. Based on Study
1, we chose Food as a possible contrast category to highlight
the comparatively strong impact of changes in aesthetic taste,
yet also wondered whether the original findings would replicate.
Following the “the larger the aesthetic distance, the larger the
impact on the self ” hypothesis from Study 2 we also aimed
to replicate the findings for music. To test whether this would
replicate we presented three items with remote distance genre
changes (Far-Genres) as well as three close distance genre changes
(Close-Genres), interpreting both as independent categories. We
therefore decided to compared the genres that were perceived
in direct comparison as most distant and those that are least
distant in our independent genre comparison study (Pretest
2, consult Supplementary Material B). For the Art category
we also included an “exemplar vignette” that presented two
artworks that were supposed to indicate the artwork preferred
prior to (Figure 4B, left image) and after a change (right image),
mirroring the change from more traditional to more abstract,
contemporary art from the descriptive vignette. As in Study 1 we
first assessed the Self Effect within categories and then compared
the Self Effect between categories.
Results and Discussion
Self Effect Within Categories
Using Kruskal Wallis tests we did not find significant differences
between Self Effects within the two Music categories: “Far
Genres” and “Close Genres” (all p ≥ 0.698). Mann–Whitney U
tests also revealed no significant differences between our items
for the Food category and for the two Art conditions (i.e., with
or without visualization in the vignette, p ≥ 0.98). This led us
to retain the following four categories as meta conditions: Art,
Music (Far Genres), Music (Close Genres), and Food (for a full
list of means per item consult Table 5).
Self Effect Between Categories
Kruskal Wallis test showed a significant difference between
our categories: H(3) = 17.478, p = 0.001. Subsequent pairwise
TABLE 5 | Means and SD for Self Effect in Study 3.
Category Domain Mean (SD)
Per domain Per category
Art Traditional to abstract
(images)
4.58 (1.891) 4.12 (1.837)
Traditional to abstract (no
images)
3.68 (1.667)
Music (far genres) Classic to punk 4.00 (1.414) 3.89 (1.733)
Electronic to gospel 4.00 (1.732)
HipHop to classic 3.68 (1.974)
Music (Close Genres) Folk to country 3.52 (1.651) 3.26 (1.566)
Pop to rock 3.20 (1.744)
Rock to punk 3.09 (1.213)
Food Italian to Asian 2.86 (1.358) 2.83 (1.388)
Spicy to mild 2.79 (1.414)
In descending order of mean per category and then domain.
comparisons using the Mann–Whitney U test revealed significant
differences for Art (Mdn = 4.0) and Close Genres (Mdn = 3.0),
U = 1235.0, z = −2.526, p = 0.012, and Food (Mdn = 3.0),
U = 668.0, z = −3.470, p = 0.001, as well as for Far Genres
(Mdn = 4.0) and Close Genres, U = 2001.0, z = −2.144, p = 0.032
and Far Genres and Food, U = 1085.5, z = −3.289, p = 0.001.
No significant difference was found for Close Genres and Food,
U = 1341.5, z = −1.430, p = 0.153, as well as for Art and Far
Genres U = 1658.5, z = −0.689, p = 0.491 (Figure 4A).
Discussion
This study confirmed our key prediction: also changes in visual
art preference impact judgments of identity. This corroborated
the Aesthetic Self Effect for the domain of visual art, just as
we had found it (and replicated) for music, indicating that the
relationship between aesthetic taste and identity is not limited to
a single artform.
Moreover, as we have already shown with music, the
relationship between taste in fine art and our Self Effect does
not seem to correlate to the rated Importance of the respective
domain. Despite the perceived personal irrelevance of the domain
of art in the lives of our participants, they rated an art taste
change to have a strong impact on their identity (nominally
the domain Art even contained the strongest item for Self
Effect, M = 4.58). Our importance measure yielded a significant
difference across our conditions; KW: H(3) = 65.961, p < 0.001.
Post hoc pairwise comparisons using MW tests showed that this
was exclusively driven by the Art category (Mdn = 4, M = 3.61),
being significantly less important to our participants than the
Music and Food domains (Mdns = 6, for all pairwise comparisons
p < 0.001). This confirmed our assumption that, in the general
population, fine art matters less to people than music. This makes
the finding with art even more striking, since participants think
that taste in fine art relates to identity even though fine art is
not especially important to them. This suggests that consciously
valuing a certain trait is not required for making that trait
central to one’s identity nor that participants personally value that
dimension. What seems to matter more given our preliminary
data is the domain of the value as well as the distance between
the two endpoints of the change in said domain (in our case
aesthetic distance).
In this study we did not test whether the degree of aesthetic
difference between our stimuli impacts the degree of change in
identity. This is because – in contrast to musical genres – we
were not confident that people have consistent intuitions about
which artistic styles are most similar. Psychological research on
the stability of preferences has also demonstrated that human
aesthetic stability is also astonishingly low when it comes to
visual art stimuli (Pugach et al., 2017). Future work might explore
that possibility.
A difference between this experiment and findings reported
earlier is that here we failed to find any significant correlations
among participant ratings for our Self Effect and Relationship
measures within any of our categories. Thus, we did not replicate
the pattern for Music in Study 2, which indicated that the
degree of change in identity may be associated with impact on
membership in social groups. Nor did we find an association
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 March 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 577703
fpsyg-11-577703 March 3, 2021 Time: 18:16 # 12
Fingerhut et al. The Aesthetic Self
between identity change and social relationships for the two
conditions in the domain of visual art (Spearman Correlations
for all categories: r = 0.053–0.177, all p ≥ 0.223). Thus, we
cannot draw definitive conclusions about the role of social ties
and personal relationships in mediating the impact of aesthetic
taste change on personal identity. The earlier finding suggests that
social relationships may play some role, but they clearly are not
the whole story. Taste itself, not mere group membership, may be
important to judgments about identity.
STUDY 4: THE ANAESTHETIC SELF
EFFECT
Introduction
In the previous studies, most of our vignettes involved a change
within a trait or with respect to a domain in which participants
had to assume that they already entertain a preference. This is
different from the adoption of a what could be considered new
trait. For example, we asked participants to imagine a change
from one political party to another, or from one taste preference
or style to another. One of the exceptions to this pattern were
our vignettes about leisure activities: there we presented cases in
which somebody picked up an activity they were not interested in
before (i.e., beginning to play videogames or taking up hiking).8
In Study 4, we were interested in looking at the impact of
adopting new traits in the aesthetic domain. We wanted to know
if the Aesthetic Self Effect was driven by changes in taste or
whether it could also extend to cases where there was a transition
from no taste (aesthetic indifference) to aesthetic enthusiasm.
We specifically wondered whether changes that would come
with picking up an aesthetic interest would lead to a stronger
impact on identity compared to picking up a leisure activity.
The prediction was that the acquisition of an interest in music,
art, or beauty more generally, would have a greater impact on
identity than taking up non-aesthetic activities, based on our
previous findings. We termed the new conditions “Anaesthetic”
conditions as they describe situations in which someone who
does not have an aesthetic interest (an “anaesthete”) develops an
aesthetic interest or taste in this domain.
We also wanted to explore to what extent dedicating further
resources to engagement with the arts (learning an instrument,
dedicating your life to a career in music) would elicit a stronger
Self Effect compared to merely experiencing them (wanting
to listen to music). If the aesthetic self hypothesis is robust,
acquisition of interest in the arts should impact identity even
if there is no interest becoming a professional. We predicted
that dedicating further resources might have an additional effect
enhancing the impact on the self, yet that picking up an aesthetic
interest in a domain such as music might be sufficient to elicit an
Anaesthetic Self Effect.
8Another example of this was our Religion condition, where we asked participant
to imagine a change from being a faithful believer to becoming an atheist, which,
under some descriptions could also be considered a loss of a trait. See also the
“General Discussion” for this.
Materials and Methods
305 German adults (Mdn age = 35; range 18–69, 44.6% identified
as female, 54.4% identified as male) were recruited for the
Pretest online via Clickworker. Nine additional participants were
excluded for failing to complete the study.
The set-up and general wording were as in Studies 2–3,
producing a 6 × 1 between-subjects design. We asked
participants how important the domain (such as music, art,
and beauty) was for them and presented them with a change-
vignette within this domain in which they had to imagine picking
up an activity or interest that they previously did not have.
They were then asked to give ratings on our Self Effect and
Relationship measures, again anchored on a seven-point Likert
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“completely”), followed by
the same demographic questions as in our earlier studies. We
did not replicate the two Leisure conditions from Study 1 but
incorporated them as control into our main analysis.9
Results and Discussion
Self Effect Within Categories
A Mann–Whitney U test revealed no significant difference
within our categories. Generally wanting to experience art
more (Mdn = 5.0) and becoming passionate about visual art
(Mdn = 5.0) was not significantly different on our Self Effect
measure: U = 1020.0, z = −1.144, p = 0.253. Most interestingly, a
Kruskal Wallis comparison also revealed no significant difference
between our three music conditions H(2) = 1.878, p = 0.391.
For example, “dedicating your life to music” did not render a
stronger effect than “wanting to listen to music all the time.” This
suggests that the link between aesthetic interest and identity does
not depend on vocational choice. This left us with four meta-
categories regarding the pick-up of a trait: Leisure, Music, Art,
and Beauty. (For a full list of means per item, consult Table 6).
Self Effect Between Categories
A Kruskal Wallis comparison of the four meta-conditions
showed that they were significantly different from each other
with respect to our self-measure: H(3) = 17.474, p = 0.001.
Mann–Whitney U tests showed that Leisure (Mdn = 3.0) was
significantly different from all other conditions, i.e., compared
to Music (Mdn = 5.0) U = 3511.5, z = −3.401, p = 0.001,
Beauty (Mdn = 5.0) U = 1024.5, z = −3.368, p = 0.001 and Art
(Mdn = 5.0) U = 2003.0, z = −3.72, p = 0.000 (Figure 5A). The
three Anaesthetic conditions were not significantly different from
each other (p ≥ 0.356).
Using a Kruskal Wallis Comparison for the Importance scores
revealed a significant difference between our meta-conditions in
this measure: H(3) = 63.324, p < 0.001). This effect was driven
by the Art condition (Mdn = 4.0, M = 4.0): Art was significantly
less important to our participants than all other domains (Leisure
Mdn = 6.0, M = 5.75, Music Mdn = 6.0, M = 5.66, Beauty
Mdn = 6.0, M = 5.75, p = 0.001).
As before, a Spearman’s correlation used to assess the
relationship between ratings of Importance and Self Effect for
9A side effect of this was that we did not have the additional relationship measure
for leisure that we only introduced after Study 1.
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TABLE 6 | Means and SD for Self Effect of the Anaesthetic conditions in Study 4.
Category Item
From not caring about beauty (art,
visual art, music, hiking, playing
video games) to now...
Mean (SD)
Per item Per category
Beauty ...wanting to surround oneself with
beautiful objects
4.65 (1.532) 4.65 (1.532)
Art ...wanting to experience art more 4.78 (1.741) 4.60 (1.721)
...being passionate about seeing
visual art
4.42 (1.681)
Music ...learning to play an instrument and
dedicating life to music
4.60 (1.789) 4.40 (1.719)
...learning an instrument and
wanting to play all the time
4.43 (1.631)
...wanting to listen to music all the
time
4.17 (1.707)
Leisure ...being passionate about hiking 3.55 (1.955) 3.46 (1.893)
...being passionate about playing
video games
3.37 (1.816)
In descending order of means per category.
each category was not significant (p ≥ 0.144). A Spearman’s
correlation between Self Effect and assumed change to
Relationships ratings yielded a positive statistically significant
correlation only for the Art condition, rs = 0.278, p = 0.006
(Figure 5B). All other correlations were not significant
(p ≥ 0.355).
Discussion
Our main question in Study 4 was whether the acquisition of
an interest in the arts would have an impact on identity, as
we have previously shown for changes in aesthetic taste. Our
results provide an affirmative answer. That is, the acquisition
of an aesthetic interest or of an engagement with the arts has
a large impact on identity, and decidedly so compared to the
acquisition of leisure activities. This was somewhat surprising,
given the already strong impact of leisure changes in Study 1. It
provides further support to our hypothesis that aesthetic values
are among the more impactful contributors to identity. An even
more surprising finding was that we found no difference between
a pure aesthetic condition (coming to care about an aesthetic
domain such as music) and conditions that additionally included
an activity or commitment (learning to play an instrument and
dedicating life to music). This gives support to an inherently
aesthetic effect independent of associated dedication of resources
or activities. It is the presence of aesthetic engagement or
experience itself, not the associated activities, that seems to drive
judgments about identity here.
Another general question one might ask is whether the
acquisition of a new domain of interest would be perceived as
having a larger impact on the self, compared to a preference
change within a domain. We addressed this by checking whether
Aesthetic conditions (the change of preference within an aesthetic
domain) and Anaesthetic conditions (the picking up an aesthetic
domain) would yield a difference with respect to our self-
measure. First of all, Kruskal Wallis tests showed no significant
difference within our Taste Aesthetic conditions10 and within
our Anaesthetic conditions: Taste Aesthetic: H(9) = 6.855,
p = 0.739, Anaesthetic H(4) = 4.401, p = 0.493. We then
combined all Aesthetic and all Anaesthetic conditions into
two groups. The comparison between those grouped variables
showed a significant difference: Aesthetic conditions (Mdn = 4)
showed a significantly weaker Self Effect compared to Anaesthetic
Conditions (Mdn = 5), U = 79001.5, z = 4.426, p < 0.001.
In Study 4 we also included changes in the general interest
in beauty and the arts that differed from the other conditions in
that they did not specify the art form or cultural artifacts, such as
music, visual art, paintings with respect to which the engagement
changes. Beauty elicited the second largest Self Effect for a single
vignette (M = 4.65) only exceeded by the general interest in art
(M = 4.78). This might be due to the generality of the proposed
change or due to the kind of valuing related to the conditions:
changes in art engagements and beauty engagements might be
of central importance to our selves. That changes in beauty
preferences are important might additionally supported by the
finding in Study 3 were the perceived beauty of the two exemplar
10To this end we compared all Aesthetic conditions from studies 1–3. We excluded
the close-genre conditions for Music that we considered to not elicit an Aesthetic
Self Effect, due to the aesthetic similarity of the genres.
FIGURE 5 | (A) Box plots of participants’ responses for Self Effect across categories in Study 4, ∗∗p < 0.005, two-tailed, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, two-tailed. Y-axis indicates
possibble answers on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (“very much”) to 7 (“not at all the same person”). (B) Spearman correlations between Self Effect and
relationship measure in Study 4 for art domain (p < 0.05); for all other domains no significant correlations were found.
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images (consult Figure 4B) was also very different.11 The beauty
condition elicited the third largest Self Effect (Mn = 4.58). Future
studies will have to investigate how these findings relate to the
overall concepts of art and beauty.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Did We Test Identity?
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the relationship
between aesthetic taste and judgments of personal identity. One
might wonder whether a study of intuitions can shed some light
on the nature of identity itself, rather than merely revealing how
we make such judgments. We think the answer is yes, because
identity is not a deep metaphysical fact, but rather a construction.
That is, it is at least partially up to us to choose which of our
many traits matter for retaining the same identity. When we refer
to someone as the same person over various changes, we are not
necessarily referring to numerical identity (Starmans and Bloom,
2018), but rather to the qualitative features that matter to us when
keeping track of people. Qualitative identity is what we care about
when we wonder whether a loved one has changed or whether
a convicted criminal is a new person after undergoing a moral
change while incarcerated (Gomez-Lavin and Prinz, 2019). It is
this notion of identity that arises when we express existential
concerns that a dramatic experience in life could change who we
are (see Schechtman on identity crises, 1996: 74).
It may be surprising to find an empirical link between
aesthetics and identity, since there has been so little exploration
of this connection in either empirical aesthetics or psychology.
But, again, we think the connection does resonate with common
sense. We often hold on to our youthful tastes in music and
art, and we make these tastes priorities in our free time. We
also talk about art that “speaks to me” or “expresses who I
am.” In a recent phenomenological interview study conducted
in a contemporary art museum we found that participants chose
artworks as their favorites that fulfill such personal criteria over
other artworks they found interesting but that did not “reflect
who I am!” (Fingerhut et al., n.d..). Such phrases indicate that
our qualitative sense of identity is bound up with our personal art
preferences, along with other traits. Clearly the arts matter a great
deal to us, and the present findings suggest that this importance
goes beyond mere liking and is bound up with our sense of who
we are. Changes in the general interest in the arts might also
indicate a change in a general outlook including an openness
to new experiences and cognitively demanding situations, which
have been related to an artistic personality (Chamorro-Premuzic
et al., 2007). This outlook might also forge social bonds with
groups or people that hold the same aesthetic values we endorse.
Both genre preferences (e.g., being an opera buff) and an overall
interest in the arts (e.g., being an “culture maven”) might be
thought of as human types. We hope that the findings here,
11This was assessed in a different study with an independent sample of participants.
The Romney (left image) received average ratings of 77 out of 100 for beauty (being
among the highest rated), while ratings for the Malevich were below the midpoint
of our scale. The exemplar vignette in the present study therefore possibly indicates
a change in preference for beauty by switching between the two.
though preliminary, will help prompt further investigation into
the aesthetic self.
Relation to Other Findings
Recent empirical work has found a consistent and robust
association between judgments about personal identity and moral
traits, values, and behaviors. The so-called “moral self ” was
established by showing that changes in an individual’s set of
moral values elicited larger impacts on perceived identity than
other candidates stemming from the philosophy of identity,
particularly the notion that continuity of autobiographical
memory should matter most (Strohminger and Nichols, 2014;
Prinz and Nichols, 2016; Heiphetz et al., 2017). A few prior
studies examined aesthetic traits and preference; however, these
traits were found to be less central to identity compared to moral
ones, prompting the authors to suggest that they found “strong
and unequivocal support for the essential moral self hypothesis”
(Strohminger and Nichols, 2014: 168).
Our studies showed that aesthetic traits can play a similar
role. Why did we find an Aesthetic Self Effect that those studies
did not find? First, we used a different design. In our between-
subject design we presented each participant with only a single
change in their life that they had to rate on its possible impact
on their identity. The rationale for this was that we wanted
participants to imagine more vividly such a change (with the
experiential components coming with it). The same rationale
also led us to include a question regarding the domain itself
(“How important is x for you?”) in order to prime thinking
about a domain before presenting the change vignette. Most
other studies implemented a within-subjects design with several
vignettes presented simultaneously which allowed participants to
directly compare moral changes to changes in other categories,
including in aesthetic traits. Any effect found in such studies
might be confounded by overt comparisons between aesthetic
and moral domains (the former perceived as more leisure related,
e.g., music, the other as more serious, e.g., politics and religion).
Another explanation for the divergence in findings could
be that Strohminger and Nichols (2014) presented participants
with loss of traits whereas we presented participants with the
possibility of gaining a trait—by, for example, going from
disinterestedness about music to imagining that they would
actively engaging with it. Perhaps participants more severely
judge losing a moral trait than to lose an aesthetic interest. In
order to assess this possibility, we conducted a follow-up study.
236 German adults (Mdn age = 31, range 18–68; 46.2% identified
as female, 53.0% identified as male) were recruited online via
Clickworker (2 additional participants were excluded for failing
to complete the study). We reversed several of our conditions
in which we described the gaining of a trait: the two conditions
from our leisure category (Study 1) and one item of each of
our anaesthetic categories (Study 4): music, art, and beauty.
Pairwise comparisons of reverse to original conditions using
Mann–Whitney U tests yielded no significant difference between
gaining or losing a trait for any of those conditions (p ≥ 0.159).
The reverse condition interestingly attenuated our effect though,
with all measure moving more toward the mid-point of our
scale with only the “losing your interest in beautiful things”
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condition (Mdn = 5.0, M = 4.69) remaining significantly different
from the leisure category yet the trend fully intact (Mdn = 4.0,
M = 3.94), U = 737.0, z = −2.070, p = 0.038, for full list consult
Supplementary Material C).
Methodological Considerations:
Imagining Preferences and Changes
Our experimental set-up (as well as the experimental literature
on personal identity we build upon) focuses on counterfactual
changes that participants have to imagine based on descriptive
vignettes presented to them. They then have to rate the perceived
change to identity that this might entail. Such a methodological
set-up has advantages but also serious limitations. Any results we
might find could, for example, be confounded by the vividness
in which subjects are able to imagine a trait, preference, or
activity described in our vignettes. We asked subjects to imagine
having a trait (e.g., liking classical music) and then to undergo
a change with respect to this trait (e.g., to then like pop music).
Whether a participant is indeed a classical music lover might
affect the perceived change to identity: they might report a higher
Self Effect given that they experiences more vividly what such a
preference entails (having, e.g., more associations and an affective
bond related to it) and therefore also rate the moving away
from it as a bigger change to the person they are.12 Conversely,
it may also be the case that asking participants to imaging
changing with respect to an unfamiliar or “alien” trait might
elicit a stronger Self Effect (e.g., imagining “dedicating your life to
music” for a music grouch). We did not account for such factors
in our studies. Future studies might provide this information by
asking participants whether they actually entertain a preference
with respect to an aesthetic genre or style that is presented in
the vignette. In our studies we aimed for something similar,
yet in a more general fashion: we asked how important the
respective domain (i.e., Politics, Religion, Music, Art, Beauty,
etc.) employed in the vignette was for the participants. This
was done prior to asking them to imagine a counterfactual
change within this domain and partly to prepare them for the
change presented in the following vignette (i.e., to enhance their
vividness). Interestingly, we did not find an effect of rated self-
importance of a domain on our self-measure in any of our studies
(Spearman’s correlation used to assess within subject relations
between rated Importance and Self Effect per each category were
not significant; p ≥ 0.144).
It was not our goal to assess how enduring or convertible
aesthetic taste is over the lifespan, nor whether our participants
actually underwent taste or personality changes in their lives.
Other studies have explored aesthetic preference stability and
malleability across different time spans, by focusing, for example,
on the stability of preferences for geometric figures (McManus
et al., 2010), the impact of sensorimotor experience on affective
relation to dance (Kirsch and Cross, 2018), or the relative
instability for aesthetic ratings for visual art (Pugach et al.,
2017) as well as the stability and strength of preferences for
music (Schäfer, 2016). There are also more general models of
how sensory inputs, motivations, and reward might influence
12Thanks to Reviewer 2 for pointing this out.
aesthetic preferences over a life span (Aleem et al., 2020). We are
currently conducting follow-up studies exploring more directly
the occurrence of significant taste changes by letting participants
self-report experienced taste changes in their lives followed by
an assessment of whether they judge this to have been a change
in their identity. Generally, we believe that the aesthetic-identity
link constitutes an exciting new field of research to which we hope
to have contributed with our present studies.
Mechanisms and Motives: Emotions and
Social Signaling
In our studies we did little to directly investigate why aesthetic
values are linked to identity. What mechanisms mediate this
link? Why might the association to the arts matter to people?
Regarding mechanisms, social signaling and bonding might
play a role: both morals and aesthetics have social significance.
Tracking a person’s moral identity might help us to determine
whether somebody might be helpful or harmful toward oneself
(Goodwin, 2015). Aesthetics might be central in the very same
respect, helping us to identify whether somebody shares a general
outlook with ourselves. Music and art taste can indicate moral
values, cultural identity, and social class, and they also are a
source of bonding in their own right. Someone with similar
taste may be more likely to treat you preferentially (Tajfel, 1970).
Future work can explore this possibility: we might perceive a
change in taste as a blow to our identity because it indicates
that we might belong to a different social group given such a
taste. We believe that this view of the self as grounded in the
relation to others holds a great plausibility. We also aimed to
test this possibility by including a social change measure: we
asked participants to what extent they think whether the change
presented would impact their relationship to their friends. The
findings here were inconclusive: We did find a correlation for
some conditions but not for all. Assessing this correlation across
all studies we find a positive correlation between Self Effect
of our aesthetic conditions and change in relationship among
friends (using Spearman: r = 0.263, p < 0.001). This effect was
more pronounced than the one we found for all our Anaesthetic
conditions (r = 0.148, p = 0.01), implying that to some extent the
impact of taste changes (i.e., aesthetic preference changes) might
be grounded in the change in social relationship they indicate.
Emotions and social factors may work together. Emotionally
expressing a preference signals one’s membership in likeminded
social groups in a fast and direct way. Research might explore the
extent to which a display of preference both impacts others and
increases a sense of affiliation. One might then explore whether
such shared dimensions of taste lead to strong links between
taste and identity. Emotional signaling with respect to taste may
simultaneously increase social identity (preferential affiliation)
and the aesthetic dimensions of personal identity (the degree to
which the shared dimension of taste would impact identity were
it to change). The link to emotions might also be established
in a more direct way as well: aesthetic evaluations and our
appreciation of the arts may be affective by nature (Prinz, 2011).
Aesthetic attitudes can be construed as motivational states that
dispose our embodied and situated selves to engage with cultural
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artifacts (Fingerhut and Prinz, 2018b, 2020). Behavioral studies
point to links between emotional and social processes in domains
of taste: the less access participants have to their emotions and
the emotions of others (emotional contagion) the less interesting
the artworks and the lower liking ratings they give (Gerger
et al., 2018). Certain emotional profiles also correlate with the
liking of specific art genres. it has, for example, been shown that
participants with higher scores for neuroticism prefer abstract
art over more classical representational artworks (Furnham and
Walker, 2001; Lyssenko et al., 2016). Again, more studies are
conducted on this in the moral domain compared to aesthetics
and the arts, yet future studies might explore this joint link to the
emotions and its contribution to a sense of self.
Summary and Outlook
We have explored how the relationship between aesthetic
preferences and personal identity is conceived within a general
population. We sought to test the hypothesis that people
would regard changes in aesthetic taste as changes in the self.
This hypothesis emerged as an extension of recent research
on the relationship between moral values and judgments
of identity, but it also falls in line with previous work in
psychology and sociology. There has been prior psychological
work correlating aesthetic preferences and personality, and
sociologists have long associated aesthetic preferences with
aspects of social identity such as status, class, and membership
in subcultures. In addition, ordinary language includes phrases
such as “art person” and “music person.” Lastly, work on aesthetic
evaluation in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy attests
to the centrality of emotional processing for aesthetics and art
appreciation (Brown et al., 2011; Fingerhut and Prinz, 2018a,
2020; Menninghaus et al., 2019) revealing a similarity to moral
judgments. None of these observations directly speaks to our
hypothesis, but they help to motivate the investigation that we
undertook here. To our knowledge this is the first systematic
exploration of the hypothesis that changes in taste and aesthetic
values would be perceived as impacting the identity of the person
undergoing the change.
Our experiments established a link between identity and taste.
We interpret this as showing that people have “aesthetic selves” –
that is, we attribute to ourselves and others a dimension of
identity that revolves around preferences for art. This includes
a general interest in the arts (being an art person or music
person) as well as the specific artistic taste one has. A shift in
taste is judged to be a shift in identity. This transformational
capacity through our engagements and preferences in the arts
is the Aesthetic Self Effect. Future work might also investigate
whether the effect extends to interests and taste in architecture,
film, theater, dance, and the other arts. One particular interesting
domain of taste in this respect is fashion, which in a unique way
already combines the arts and the expression of identity.
It was not a primary goal here to determine the mechanisms
underlying this effect. The impact on social group membership
was explored in a preliminary way with inconclusive results.
Another possibility suggested at the outset is that aesthetic
values have a basis in emotions and that emotional continuity is
perceived as important to identity. Alternatively, the relationship
could be mediated by our participants’ assumptions about artistic
taste and moral values, cultural affiliations, class, and other
variables that we did not measure here. Future work should
investigate these and other possibilities.
Research on aesthetic psychology has intensively studied
preference and aesthetic experiences, but, outside of sociology,
these preferences are rarely linked to identity. This opens up new
lines of investigation. Perhaps liking art is not just a matter of
finding intrinsic features of artworks appealing, but also involves
asserting something about one’s self. The findings here are the
first of their kind, and they have implications for both the study
of personal identity and the study of aesthetic psychology. Each
domain of inquiry has tended to ignore the other. If aesthetics
is a component of identity the menu of leading philosophical
theories needs to be expanded. We tend to think of taste and the
arts as merely recreational. Taste also is often seen external to the
individual in so far as it is culturally transmitted and involves
relationships to cultural artifacts. We have shown that taste is
perceived as being central to who we are. Therefore, theories of
identity should be updated to recognize that personal identity
may be aesthetic, cultural and situated, in that it involves relations
to social and material things outside the individual organism.
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